13 ideas
| 23877 | Most people won't question an idea's truth if they depend on it [Weil] |
| 10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
| 10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
| 10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
| 10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
| 10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
| 10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
| 10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
| 10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
| 16672 | Quantity is the quantified parts of a thing, plus location and coordination [Olivi] |
| 23878 | Weakness of will is the inadequacy of the original impetus to carry through the action [Weil] |
| 23879 | In a violent moral disagreement, it can't be that both sides are just following social morality [Weil] |
| 23880 | When war was a profession, customary morality justified any act of war [Weil] |