18 ideas
10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
8859 | The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo] |
10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
8865 | If 'the number of Democrats is on the rise', does that mean that 50 million is on the rise? [Yablo] |
10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
8863 | We must treat numbers as existing in order to express ourselves about the arrangement of planets [Yablo] |
8862 | Platonic objects are really created as existential metaphors [Yablo] |
8979 | Slow and continuous events (like balding or tree-growth) are called 'processes', not 'events' [Simons] |
8981 | Maybe processes behave like stuff-nouns, and events like count-nouns [Simons] |
8973 | Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons] |
8864 | We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo] |
8858 | Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo] |
8861 | Hardly a word in the language is devoid of metaphorical potential [Yablo] |