17 ideas
10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
17488 | Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan] |
17493 | Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan] |
17487 | Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan] |
17489 | Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan] |
17490 | 17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan] |
17491 | Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan] |
20062 | If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong [Chisholm] |
20054 | There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent [Chisholm] |
17494 | Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan] |