38 ideas
| 6123 | Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour [Merricks] |
| 2572 | Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack] |
| 2570 | The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative [Haack] |
| 10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
| 10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
| 10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
| 10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
| 10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
| 10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
| 10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
| 10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
| 6143 | Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time [Merricks] |
| 6135 | A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent [Merricks] |
| 6145 | Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists [Merricks] |
| 6124 | I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist [Merricks] |
| 6134 | Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts? [Merricks] |
| 6125 | We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples [Merricks] |
| 14229 | Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics [Merricks, by Liggins] |
| 6142 | The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways [Merricks] |
| 14472 | If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it [Merricks, by Thomasson] |
| 14469 | Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage [Merricks] |
| 6137 | Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing) [Merricks] |
| 6141 | There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise [Merricks] |
| 6127 | 'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing [Merricks] |
| 6131 | Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things [Merricks] |
| 6132 | Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts [Merricks] |
| 6130 | 'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object [Merricks] |
| 6138 | It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located [Merricks] |
| 6128 | Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region [Merricks] |
| 6136 | Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox [Merricks] |
| 6133 | If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy [Merricks] |
| 6150 | The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge [Merricks] |
| 6144 | You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software [Merricks] |
| 6140 | Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons [Merricks] |
| 6149 | Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice [Merricks] |
| 6148 | Human organisms can exercise downward causation [Merricks] |
| 6147 | The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties [Merricks] |
| 6146 | Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties [Merricks] |