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All the ideas for 'Logical Consequence', 'Essays on Active Powers 1: Active power' and 'The Folly of Trying to Define Truth'

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23 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
23295 Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
23298 Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
23297 The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
23296 We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
10688 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10690 Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
10691 Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10695 Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
10689 A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10696 A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10693 Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
10692 Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
23664 Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined [Reid]
23669 Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon [Reid]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
23666 It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
23294 It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
23665 Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
23668 Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
20051 Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8383 Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Reid, by Crane]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
23667 Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
23670 Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations [Reid]
23671 Laws are rules for effects, but these need a cause; rules of navigation don't navigate [Reid]