Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logical Consequence', 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom' and 'The Case for Contextualism'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
6859 Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
10688 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
6862 Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
6858 Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10690 Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
10691 Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10695 Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
10689 A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10696 A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10693 Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
10692 Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
6863 Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
6861 What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
6860 How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
19513 A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
19514 Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose]
19515 We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose]
19510 In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose]
19516 Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
19511 If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose]