18 ideas
10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
9193 | ZF set theory has variables which range over sets, 'equals' and 'member', and extensionality [Dummett] |
9194 | The main alternative to ZF is one which includes looser classes as well as sets [Dummett] |
10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
9195 | Intuitionists reject excluded middle, not for a third value, but for possibility of proof [Dummett] |
9186 | First-order logic concerns objects; second-order adds properties, kinds, relations and functions [Dummett] |
9187 | Logical truths and inference are characterized either syntactically or semantically [Dummett] |
10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
9191 | Ordinals seem more basic than cardinals, since we count objects in sequence [Dummett] |
10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
9192 | The number 4 has different positions in the naturals and the wholes, with the same structure [Dummett] |
19701 | Fallibilism is consistent with dogmatism or scepticism, and is not alternative to them [Dougherty] |
19700 | It is best to see the fallibility in the reasons, rather than in the agents or the knowledge [Dougherty] |
19702 | We can't normally say that we know something 'but it might be false' [Dougherty] |