15 ideas
| 7536 | If you hope to improve the world, all you can do is improve yourself [Wittgenstein] |
| 10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
| 13591 | Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine] |
| 10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
| 10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
| 10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
| 10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
| 10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
| 10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
| 10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
| 13590 | Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine] |
| 8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
| 13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
| 13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
| 13592 | Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine] |