37 ideas
13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
16608 | Ockham was an anti-realist about the categories [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
16599 | Ockham says matter must be extended, so we don't need Quantity [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
16681 | Matter gets its quantity from condensation and rarefaction, which is just local motion [William of Ockham] |
13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
23874 | Armies and businesses create moralities in which their activity can do no wrong [Marx, by Weil] |
18662 | Liberal freedom is the right to be separate, and ignores the union of man with man [Marx] |
23372 | Liberals want the right to be separate, rather than for people to be united [Marx] |
20576 | Early Marx anticipates communitarian objections to liberalism [Marx, by Oksala] |
23862 | By saying the material dialectic of history aspires to the best, Marx agreed with capitalism [Weil on Marx] |
21999 | False consciousness results from concealment by the superstructure [Marx, by Singer] |
23875 | Marx says force is everything, and that the weak will become strong, while remaining the weak [Weil on Marx] |
18653 | Marx rejected equal rights because they never actually treat people as equals [Marx, by Kymlicka] |
23876 | The essence of capitalism is the subordination of people to things [Marx, by Weil] |
20958 | Capitalism changes the world, by socialising the idea of a commodity [Marx, by Bowie] |
20960 | Marx thought capitalism was partly liberating, and could make labour and ownership more humane [Marx, by Bowie] |