Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Semantics for Propositional Attitudes', 'Idealism: a critical survey' and 'Defeasibility Theory'

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11 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
15785 Our commitments are to an 'ontology', but also to an 'ideology', or conceptual system [Hintikka]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15786 Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology [Hintikka]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
19718 Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19717 Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann]
19716 Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann]
19715 You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann]
19713 Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann]
19714 Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
19719 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
21513 We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
21497 If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]