Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Three theses about dispositions', 'Letters to Frege' and 'works'

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11 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
17892 For clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
9188 Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete [Gödel, by Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
10620 Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
17883 Gödel's Theorems did not refute the claim that all good mathematical questions have answers [Gödel, by Koellner]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
13365 Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell]
10711 Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
17885 Gödel eventually hoped for a generalised completeness theorem leaving nothing undecidable [Gödel, by Koellner]
10614 The real reason for Incompleteness in arithmetic is inability to define truth in a language [Gödel]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
9127 Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
7435 Dispositions are second-order properties, the property of having some property [Jackson/Pargetter/Prior, by Armstrong]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
7531 We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell]