Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Three theses about dispositions', 'Some Models for Implicature' and 'Truthmaking for Presentists'

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14 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron]
One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]
We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Dispositions are second-order properties, the property of having some property [Jackson/Pargetter/Prior, by Armstrong]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Grice said patterns of use are often semantically irrelevant, because it is a pragmatic matter [Grice, by Glock]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
Grice's maxim of quality says do not assert what you believe to be false [Grice, by Magidor]
Grice's maxim of manner requires one to be as brief as possible [Grice, by Magidor]
Grice's maxim of quantity says be sufficiently informative [Grice, by Magidor]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron]