80 ideas
| 12330 | In ontology, logic dominated language, until logic was mathematized [Badiou] |
| 21887 | Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida] |
| 21888 | Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida] |
| 21896 | Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May] |
| 21893 | Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida] |
| 12318 | The female body, when taken in its entirety, is the Phallus itself [Badiou] |
| 12325 | Philosophy has been relieved of physics, cosmology, politics, and now must give up ontology [Badiou] |
| 21892 | Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida] |
| 20925 | Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
| 20934 | Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
| 21895 | Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida] |
| 21934 | The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21883 | Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida] |
| 21882 | Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida] |
| 21881 | We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida] |
| 12324 | Consensus is the enemy of thought [Badiou] |
| 4756 | Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel] |
| 21877 | True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida] |
| 10354 | Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts [Kusch] |
| 10353 | Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets [Kusch] |
| 12337 | There is 'transivity' iff membership ∈ also means inclusion ⊆ [Badiou] |
| 12321 | The axiom of choice must accept an indeterminate, indefinable, unconstructible set [Badiou] |
| 12342 | Topos theory explains the plurality of possible logics [Badiou] |
| 12341 | Logic is a mathematical account of a universe of relations [Badiou] |
| 21878 | Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida] |
| 21889 | 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida] |
| 21879 | Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida] |
| 12335 | Numbers are for measuring and for calculating (and the two must be consistent) [Badiou] |
| 12334 | There is no single unified definition of number [Badiou] |
| 12333 | Each type of number has its own characteristic procedure of introduction [Badiou] |
| 12322 | Must we accept numbers as existing when they no longer consist of units? [Badiou] |
| 12327 | The undecidability of the Continuum Hypothesis may have ruined or fragmented set theory [Badiou] |
| 12329 | If mathematics is a logic of the possible, then questions of existence are not intrinsic to it [Badiou] |
| 12328 | Platonists like axioms and decisions, Aristotelians like definitions, possibilities and logic [Badiou] |
| 12331 | Logic is definitional, but real mathematics is axiomatic [Badiou] |
| 12340 | There is no Being as a whole, because there is no set of all sets [Badiou] |
| 12323 | Existence is Being itself, but only as our thought decides it [Badiou] |
| 12332 | The modern view of Being comes when we reject numbers as merely successions of One [Badiou] |
| 12326 | The primitive name of Being is the empty set; in a sense, only the empty set 'is' [Badiou] |
| 12320 | Ontology is (and always has been) Cantorian mathematics [Badiou] |
| 10337 | We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge [Kusch] |
| 10357 | Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind [Kusch] |
| 10339 | Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch] |
| 10331 | Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch] |
| 10338 | The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch] |
| 10340 | Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch] |
| 10345 | Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch] |
| 10350 | Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch] |
| 10343 | Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason [Kusch] |
| 10341 | Justification depends on the audience and one's social role [Kusch] |
| 10334 | Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics [Kusch] |
| 10336 | Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives [Kusch] |
| 10324 | Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge [Kusch] |
| 10327 | Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences [Kusch] |
| 10329 | Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories [Kusch] |
| 10330 | A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth [Kusch] |
| 10325 | Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism [Kusch] |
| 10335 | Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism [Kusch] |
| 10323 | Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people [Kusch] |
| 10348 | Private justification is justification to imagined other people [Kusch] |
| 21890 | Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida] |
| 10349 | To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society [Kusch] |
| 21880 | 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida] |
| 10344 | Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch] |
| 21886 | Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida] |
| 21930 | For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida] |
| 21884 | Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida] |
| 21935 | The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida] |
| 21933 | Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21894 | Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida] |
| 21931 | 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21885 | Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida] |
| 10358 | Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them [Kusch] |
| 12338 | We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject [Badiou] |
| 21891 | The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida] |
| 10333 | Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower [Kusch] |
| 12316 | For Enlightenment philosophers, God was no longer involved in politics [Badiou] |
| 10351 | Natural kinds are social institutions [Kusch] |
| 10332 | Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept [Kusch] |
| 12317 | The God of religion results from an encounter, not from a proof [Badiou] |