Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Vagueness' and 'To be is to be the value of a variable..'

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42 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
21887 Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
21888 Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
21896 Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
21893 Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
21892 Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida]
20925 Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
20934 Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
21895 Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
21934 The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning]
21883 Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida]
21882 Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida]
21881 We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
4756 Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel]
21877 True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
7785 The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
10699 Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10225 Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10736 Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
10780 Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
10697 Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
21597 Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
21878 Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida]
21889 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
21879 Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
13671 Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10267 We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro]
10698 Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
7806 Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
9051 Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic [Russell, by Keefe/Smith]
9054 Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
10700 First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
21890 Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
21880 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
21886 Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida]
21930 For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida]
21884 Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida]
21935 The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida]
21933 Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning]
21894 Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
21931 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
21885 Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
21891 The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida]