Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Perceptual experience has conceptual content' and 'Individuals without Sortals'

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44 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
21887 Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
21888 Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
21896 Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
21893 Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
21892 Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida]
20925 Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
20934 Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
21895 Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
21934 The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning]
21883 Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida]
21882 Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida]
21881 We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
4756 Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel]
21877 True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
21889 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida]
21878 Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
21879 Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
17518 Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
17516 If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
17520 Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
17519 To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
17510 Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
17522 We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
17515 Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
17511 Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17517 Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17513 If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
17523 Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17521 You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
17514 Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17509 Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8875 Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements [Brewer,B]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
21890 Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
21880 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
21886 Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida]
21930 For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida]
21884 Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida]
21935 The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida]
21933 Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning]
21894 Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
21931 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
21885 Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
21891 The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida]