61 ideas
21887 | Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida] |
21888 | Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida] |
21896 | Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May] |
21893 | Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida] |
13736 | Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure [Schaffer,J on Quine] |
21892 | Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida] |
20925 | Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
20934 | Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
21895 | Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida] |
21934 | The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21883 | Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida] |
21882 | Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida] |
21881 | We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida] |
4756 | Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel] |
21877 | True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida] |
3302 | Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
10211 | Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists [Quine, by Shapiro] |
3336 | Two things can never entail three things [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
8453 | If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers [Quine] |
21878 | Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida] |
21889 | 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida] |
21879 | Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida] |
10311 | No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts [Quine, by Hale] |
10538 | Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction [Quine, by Dummett] |
10793 | Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
8466 | For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics [Quine, by Orenstein] |
8467 | Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit' [Quine, by Orenstein] |
10667 | A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Quine, by Hossack] |
16021 | Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Quine, by Noonan] |
3325 | For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
8534 | Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications [Quine, by Armstrong] |
10295 | Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Quine, by Shapiro] |
3322 | Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
6078 | Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [Quine, by McGinn] |
8479 | Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Quine, by Orenstein] |
3751 | Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true [Quine, by Jacquette] |
7970 | Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Quine, by Macdonald,C] |
15783 | Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine] |
15782 | Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Quine, by Lycan] |
2796 | For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Quine, by Dancy,J] |
8450 | Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events [Quine, by Orenstein] |
3868 | To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it [Quine, by Newton-Smith] |
22179 | Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha] |
4713 | For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations [Quine, by O'Grady] |
6755 | For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird] |
17083 | The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel] |
13052 | Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon] |
21890 | Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida] |
21880 | 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida] |
21894 | Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida] |
21886 | Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida] |
21930 | For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida] |
21884 | Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida] |
21935 | The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida] |
21933 | Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21931 | 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21885 | Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida] |
4712 | Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [Quine, by O'Grady] |
7330 | The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants [Quine, by Miller,A] |
21891 | The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida] |
17862 | Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Quine, by Almog] |