Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Comment on Armstrong and Forrest' and 'Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable'

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50 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
21887 Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
21888 Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
21896 Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
21893 Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
21892 Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida]
20925 Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
20934 Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
21895 Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
21934 The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning]
21883 Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida]
21882 Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida]
21881 We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
4756 Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel]
21877 True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
10859 A set is 'well-ordered' if every subset has a first element [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
10857 Set theory made a closer study of infinity possible [Clegg]
10864 Any set can always generate a larger set - its powerset, of subsets [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
10872 Extensionality: Two sets are equal if and only if they have the same elements [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
10875 Pairing: For any two sets there exists a set to which they both belong [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / d. Axiom of Unions III
10876 Unions: There is a set of all the elements which belong to at least one set in a collection [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
10878 Infinity: There exists a set of the empty set and the successor of each element [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
10877 Powers: All the subsets of a given set form their own new powerset [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
10879 Choice: For every set a mechanism will choose one member of any non-empty subset [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / k. Axiom of Existence
10871 Axiom of Existence: there exists at least one set [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / l. Axiom of Specification
10874 Specification: a condition applied to a set will always produce a new set [Clegg]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
21889 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida]
21878 Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
21879 Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
10880 Mathematics can be 'pure' (unapplied), 'real' (physically grounded); or 'applied' (just applicable) [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
10861 Beyond infinity cardinals and ordinals can come apart [Clegg]
10860 An ordinal number is defined by the set that comes before it [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
10854 Transcendental numbers can't be fitted to finite equations [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / k. Imaginary numbers
10858 By adding an axis of imaginary numbers, we get the useful 'number plane' instead of number line [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
10853 Either lack of zero made early mathematics geometrical, or the geometrical approach made zero meaningless [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
10866 Cantor's account of infinities has the shaky foundation of irrational numbers [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
10869 The Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of set theory [Clegg]
10862 The 'continuum hypothesis' says aleph-one is the cardinality of the reals [Clegg]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
15453 The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
15452 We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
21890 Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
21880 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
21886 Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida]
21930 For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida]
21884 Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida]
21935 The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida]
21933 Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning]
21894 Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
21931 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
21885 Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
21891 The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida]