34 ideas
6840 | Derrida came to believe in the undeconstructability of justice, which cannot be relativised [Derrida, by Critchley] |
7689 | The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s [Jacquette] |
7681 | Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects [Jacquette] |
7682 | Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values [Jacquette] |
7697 | On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false [Jacquette] |
7701 | Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves? [Jacquette] |
16014 | It is controversial whether only 'numerical identity' allows two things to be counted as one [Noonan] |
7707 | To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world [Jacquette] |
7692 | Being is maximal consistency [Jacquette] |
7687 | Existence is completeness and consistency [Jacquette] |
7679 | Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic [Jacquette] |
7678 | Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics [Jacquette] |
7683 | Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties [Jacquette] |
7684 | Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs [Jacquette] |
7703 | If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette] |
7685 | An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties [Jacquette] |
7699 | Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals [Jacquette] |
16024 | I could have died at five, but the summation of my adult stages could not [Noonan] |
16023 | Stage theorists accept four-dimensionalism, but call each stage a whole object [Noonan] |
16015 | Problems about identity can't even be formulated without the concept of identity [Noonan] |
16017 | Identity is usually defined as the equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law [Noonan] |
16016 | Identity definitions (such as self-identity, or the smallest equivalence relation) are usually circular [Noonan] |
16020 | Identity can only be characterised in a second-order language [Noonan] |
16018 | Indiscernibility is basic to our understanding of identity and distinctness [Noonan] |
16019 | Leibniz's Law must be kept separate from the substitutivity principle [Noonan] |
7691 | The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette] |
7688 | The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette] |
7695 | Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette] |
7694 | We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette] |
7706 | If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette] |
7704 | Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette] |
7702 | The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism [Jacquette] |
21936 | A community must consist of singular persons, with nothing in common [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21937 | Can there be democratic friendship without us all becoming identical? [Derrida, by Glendinning] |