15 ideas
| 6840 | Derrida came to believe in the undeconstructability of justice, which cannot be relativised [Derrida, by Critchley] |
| 3626 | Knowing the attributes is enough to reveal a substance [Descartes] |
| 3630 | Our thinking about external things doesn't disprove the existence of innate ideas [Descartes] |
| 9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
| 3631 | A blind man may still contain the idea of colour [Descartes] |
| 9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
| 20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
| 9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
| 21936 | A community must consist of singular persons, with nothing in common [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21937 | Can there be democratic friendship without us all becoming identical? [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 3640 | Possible existence is a perfection in the idea of a triangle [Descartes] |
| 3639 | Necessary existence is a property which is uniquely part of God's essence [Descartes] |