12 ideas
9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
12270 | Being is one [Melissus, by Aristotle] |
9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
21932 | 'Différance' is the interwoven history of each sign [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
3059 | There is no real motion, only the appearance of it [Melissus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5100 | The void is not required for change, because a plenum can alter in quality [Aristotle on Melissus] |
456 | Nothing could come out of nothing [Melissus] |