69 ideas
21887 | Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida] |
21888 | Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida] |
21896 | Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May] |
21893 | Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida] |
18859 | Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant] |
8605 | In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis] |
21892 | Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida] |
20925 | Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
20934 | Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
21895 | Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida] |
21934 | The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21881 | We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida] |
21882 | Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida] |
21883 | Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida] |
18861 | Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant] |
4756 | Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel] |
21877 | True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida] |
18866 | Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant] |
18860 | A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant] |
18863 | What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant] |
21878 | Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida] |
21889 | 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida] |
21879 | Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida] |
8607 | Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis] |
8606 | A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis] |
8580 | Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis] |
8571 | Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis] |
10717 | Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver] |
16217 | Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley] |
8585 | Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis] |
8613 | Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis] |
8586 | Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis] |
8589 | For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis] |
15460 | All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis] |
15726 | Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis] |
7031 | Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil] |
8572 | Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis] |
18433 | There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis] |
8604 | We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis] |
14499 | Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki] |
18864 | The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant] |
15120 | Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne] |
8573 | Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis] |
8569 | I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis] |
21961 | Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW] |
8576 | The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis] |
8570 | To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis] |
8574 | Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis] |
18865 | Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant] |
21890 | Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida] |
8579 | Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis] |
21880 | 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida] |
21894 | Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida] |
21886 | Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida] |
21930 | For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida] |
21884 | Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida] |
21935 | The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida] |
21933 | Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21931 | 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21885 | Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida] |
18862 | Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant] |
8615 | We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis] |
8614 | A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis] |
21891 | The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida] |
8608 | Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis] |
8584 | Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis] |
15727 | Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis] |
8581 | Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis] |
8611 | A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis] |