Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Thinking About Mechanisms' and 'Virtues of the Mind'

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75 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Unlike knowledge, wisdom cannot be misused [Zagzebski]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wisdom is the property of a person, not of their cognitive state [Zagzebski, by Whitcomb]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida]
Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning]
Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida]
Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida]
We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Precision is only one of the virtues of a good definition [Zagzebski]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Objection by counterexample is weak, because it only reveals inaccuracies in one theory [Zagzebski]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel]
True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida]
Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Modern epistemology is too atomistic, and neglects understanding [Zagzebski]
Epistemology is excessively atomic, by focusing on justification instead of understanding [Zagzebski]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
Truth is valuable, but someone knowing the truth is more valuable [Zagzebski]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Some beliefs are fairly voluntary, and others are not at all so [Zagzebski]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
Knowledge either aims at a quantity of truths, or a quality of understanding of truths [Zagzebski]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski]
Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski]
We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski]
Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue [Zagzebski]
Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples) [Zagzebski]
We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices [Zagzebski]
A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person [Zagzebski]
A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them [Zagzebski]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine [Zagzebski]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
The self is known as much by its knowledge as by its action [Zagzebski]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
The feeling accompanying curiosity is neither pleasant nor painful [Zagzebski]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida]
For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida]
Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida]
The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida]
Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning]
Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Motives involve desires, but also how the desires connect to our aims [Zagzebski]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Modern moral theory concerns settling conflicts, rather than human fulfilment [Zagzebski]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Moral luck means our praise and blame may exceed our control or awareness [Zagzebski]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Nowadays we doubt the Greek view that the flourishing of individuals and communities are linked [Zagzebski]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue theory is hopeless if there is no core of agreed universal virtues [Zagzebski]
A virtue must always have a corresponding vice [Zagzebski]
Eight marks distingush skills from virtues [Zagzebski, by PG]
Virtues are deep acquired excellences of persons, which successfully attain desire ends [Zagzebski]
Every moral virtue requires a degree of intelligence [Zagzebski]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts [Zagzebski]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
We need phronesis to coordinate our virtues [Zagzebski]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
For the virtue of honesty you must be careful with the truth, and not just speak truly [Zagzebski]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
The courage of an evil person is still a quality worth having [Zagzebski]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver]