59 ideas
| 21887 | Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida] |
| 21888 | Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida] |
| 21896 | Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May] |
| 21893 | Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida] |
| 21892 | Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida] |
| 20925 | Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
| 20934 | Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
| 21895 | Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida] |
| 21934 | The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21883 | Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida] |
| 21882 | Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida] |
| 21881 | We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida] |
| 4756 | Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel] |
| 21877 | True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida] |
| 21878 | Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida] |
| 21889 | 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida] |
| 21879 | Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida] |
| 20146 | 'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains [Kekes] |
| 21890 | Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida] |
| 21880 | 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida] |
| 21894 | Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida] |
| 21886 | Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida] |
| 21930 | For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida] |
| 21884 | Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida] |
| 21935 | The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida] |
| 21933 | Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21931 | 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21885 | Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida] |
| 20033 | Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20034 | Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20169 | An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes] |
| 20026 | Intention is either the aim of an action, or a long-term constraint on what we can do [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20032 | Bratman rejected reducing intentions to belief-desire, because they motivate, and have their own standards [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20149 | To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes] |
| 19738 | Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes] |
| 20145 | Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes] |
| 20170 | Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes] |
| 20165 | Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes] |
| 20171 | Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes] |
| 20175 | If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes] |
| 20174 | Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes] |
| 20156 | We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes] |
| 20150 | There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes] |
| 20158 | Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes] |
| 20159 | Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes] |
| 20161 | The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes] |
| 20151 | Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes] |
| 20152 | Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes] |
| 20153 | Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes] |
| 20162 | Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes] |
| 21891 | The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida] |
| 20154 | Control is the key to well-being [Kekes] |
| 20157 | Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes] |
| 20172 | Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate [Kekes] |
| 20173 | Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting [Kekes] |
| 20155 | Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us [Kekes] |
| 20164 | The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past... [Kekes] |
| 20163 | Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program [Kekes] |
| 20148 | Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied [Kekes] |