Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus' and 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671'

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88 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
Original philosophers invariably seek inspiration from past thinkers [Pasnau]
Philosophy consists of choosing between Plato, Aristotle and Democritus [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / b. Early medieval philosophy
The commentaries of Averroes were the leading guide to Aristotle [Pasnau]
Modernity begins in the late 12th century, with Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / c. Later medieval philosophy
Once accidents were seen as real, 'Categories' became the major text for ontology [Pasnau]
In 1347, the Church effectively stopped philosophy for the next 300 years [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / d. Renaissance philosophy
Renaissance Platonism is peripheral [Pasnau]
Plato only made an impact locally in 15th century Italy [Pasnau]
After c.1450 all of Plato was available. Before that, only the first half of 'Timaeus' was known [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Philosophy could easily have died in 17th century, if it weren't for Descartes [Pasnau]
The 17th century is a metaphysical train wreck [Pasnau]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida]
Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida]
Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida]
We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida]
The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can [Pasnau]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel]
True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida]
'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
To count, we must distinguish things, and have a series with successors in it [Morris,M]
Counting needs to distinguish things, and also needs the concept of a successor in a series [Morris,M]
Discriminating things for counting implies concepts of identity and distinctness [Morris,M]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics [Pasnau]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
In mixtures, the four elements ceased to exist, replaced by a mixed body with a form [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Scholastics say there is a genuine thing if it is 'separable' [Pasnau]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
If you reject essences, questions of individuation become extremely difficult [Pasnau]
Scholastics thought Quantity could be the principle of individuation [Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism say only substances exist [Pasnau]
Corpuscularianism promised a decent account of substance [Pasnau]
Scholastics wanted to treat Aristotelianism as physics, rather than as metaphysics [Pasnau]
If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties [Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones [Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If clay survives destruction of the statue, the statue wasn't a substance, but a mere accident [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory [Pasnau]
Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle [Pasnau]
Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way [Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change [Pasnau]
There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates [Pasnau]
If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure [Pasnau]
A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do [Pasnau]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
Typical successive things are time and motion [Pasnau]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Weak ex nihilo says it all comes from something; strong version says the old must partly endure [Pasnau]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Essences must explain, so we can infer them causally from the accidents [Pasnau]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida]
Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida]
For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida]
Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida]
The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida]
Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / b. Corpuscles
Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it [Pasnau]
If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances? [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry [Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism [Pasnau]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Scholastic authors agree that matter was created by God, out of nothing [Pasnau]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / b. Transubstantiation
Transubstantion says accidents of bread and wine don't inhere in the substance [Pasnau]