63 ideas
21887 | Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida] |
21888 | Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida] |
21896 | Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May] |
21893 | Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida] |
21892 | Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida] |
20925 | Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
20934 | Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
21895 | Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida] |
21934 | The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21883 | Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida] |
21882 | Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida] |
21881 | We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida] |
18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
4756 | Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel] |
21877 | True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida] |
14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
21878 | Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida] |
21889 | 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida] |
21879 | Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida] |
18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
21890 | Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida] |
18658 | The 'Kantian' self steps back from commitment to its social situation [Kymlicka] |
21880 | 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida] |
21894 | Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida] |
21886 | Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida] |
21930 | For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida] |
21884 | Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida] |
21935 | The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida] |
21933 | Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21931 | 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21885 | Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida] |
18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
21891 | The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida] |
18650 | Teleological theories give the good priority over concern for people [Kymlicka] |
18664 | Maybe the particularist moral thought of women is better than the impartial public thinking of men [Kymlicka] |
18624 | Utilitarianism is not a decision-procedure; choice of the best procedure is an open question [Kymlicka] |
18626 | One view says start with equality, and infer equal weight to interests, and hence maximum utility [Kymlicka] |
18627 | A second view says start with maximising the good, implying aggregation, and hence equality [Kymlicka] |
18625 | To maximise utility should we double the population, even if life somewhat deteriorates? [Kymlicka] |
18638 | The difference principles says we must subsidise the costs of other people's choices [Kymlicka] |
18635 | Social contract theories are usually rejected because there never was such a contract [Kymlicka] |
18630 | Utilitarianism is no longer a distinctive political position [Kymlicka] |
18623 | The quest of the general good is partly undermined by people's past entitlements [Kymlicka] |
18628 | We shouldn't endorse preferences which reject equality, and show prejudice and selfishness [Kymlicka] |
18629 | Using utilitarian principles to make decisions encourages cold detachment from people [Kymlicka] |
18637 | Utilitarianism is irrational if it tells you to trade in your rights and resources just for benefits [Kymlicka] |
18663 | Modern liberalism has added personal privacy to our personal social lives [Kymlicka] |
18632 | Liberalism tends to give priority to basic liberties [Kymlicka] |
18656 | Marxists say liberalism is unjust, because it allows exploitation in the sale of labour [Kymlicka] |
18659 | The 'Kantian' view of the self misses the way it is embedded or situated in society [Kymlicka] |
18660 | Communitarians say we should pay more attention to our history [Kymlicka] |
18657 | Communitarian states only encourage fairly orthodox ideas of the good life [Kymlicka] |
18649 | If everyone owned himself, that would prevent slavery [Kymlicka] |
18640 | Libertarians like the free market, but they also think that the free market is just [Kymlicka] |
18651 | The most valuable liberties to us need not be the ones with the most freedom [Kymlicka] |
18661 | Ancient freedom was free participation in politics, not private independence of life [Kymlicka] |
18633 | Equal opportunities seems fair, because your fate is from your choices, not your circumstances [Kymlicka] |
18634 | Equal opportunity arbitrarily worries about social circumstances, but ignores talents [Kymlicka] |
18654 | Marxists say justice is unneeded in the truly good community [Kymlicka] |
18652 | The Lockean view of freedom depends on whether you had a right to what is restricted [Kymlicka] |
18655 | Justice corrects social faults, but also expresses respect to individuals as ends [Kymlicka] |
18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |