19 ideas
| 6840 | Derrida came to believe in the undeconstructability of justice, which cannot be relativised [Derrida, by Critchley] |
| 15464 | The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis] |
| 15463 | All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis] |
| 15461 | A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis] |
| 15462 | Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis] |
| 23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |
| 23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
| 23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
| 23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
| 23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
| 23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
| 23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
| 23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
| 23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
| 23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
| 23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
| 23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |
| 21936 | A community must consist of singular persons, with nothing in common [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21937 | Can there be democratic friendship without us all becoming identical? [Derrida, by Glendinning] |