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All the ideas for 'works', 'Letters from a Stoic' and 'Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy'

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114 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom does not lie in books, and unread people can also become wise [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise people escape necessity by willing it [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims at happiness [Seneca]
What philosophy offers humanity is guidance [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
That something is a necessary condition of something else doesn't mean it caused it [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Even philosophers have got bogged down in analysing tiny bits of language [Seneca]
'Socrates is human' expresses predication, and 'Socrates is a man' expresses identity [Russell]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida]
Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning]
Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida]
Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida]
We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
A definition by 'extension' enumerates items, and one by 'intension' gives a defining property [Russell]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
The sentence 'procrastination drinks quadruplicity' is meaningless, rather than false [Russell, by Orenstein]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel]
True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
An argument 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
The Darapti syllogism is fallacious: All M is S, all M is P, so some S is P' - but if there is no M? [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
We can enumerate finite classes, but an intensional definition is needed for infinite classes [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
Members define a unique class, whereas defining characteristics are numerous [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity says 'for any inductive cardinal, there is a class having that many terms' [Russell]
We may assume that there are infinite collections, as there is no logical reason against them [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The British parliament has one representative selected from each constituency [Russell]
Choice shows that if any two cardinals are not equal, one must be the greater [Russell]
Choice is equivalent to the proposition that every class is well-ordered [Russell]
We can pick all the right or left boots, but socks need Choice to insure the representative class [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Reducibility: a family of functions is equivalent to a single type of function [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
Propositions about classes can be reduced to propositions about their defining functions [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
Russell's proposal was that only meaningful predicates have sets as their extensions [Russell, by Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Classes are logical fictions, and are not part of the ultimate furniture of the world [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
All the propositions of logic are completely general [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
In modern times, logic has become mathematical, and mathematics has become logical [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logic can be known a priori, without study of the actual world [Russell]
Logic can only assert hypothetical existence [Russell]
Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell]
Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Russell, by Bach]
Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell]
Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida]
'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that' [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
'I met a unicorn' is meaningful, and so is 'unicorn', but 'a unicorn' is not [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
If straight lines were like ratios they might intersect at a 'gap', and have no point in common [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
New numbers solve problems: negatives for subtraction, fractions for division, complex for equations [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Could a number just be something which occurs in a progression? [Russell, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
A series can be 'Cut' in two, where the lower class has no maximum, the upper no minimum [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / j. Complex numbers
A complex number is simply an ordered couple of real numbers [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / m. One
Discovering that 1 is a number was difficult [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Numbers are needed for counting, so they need a meaning, and not just formal properties [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
The formal laws of arithmetic are the Commutative, the Associative and the Distributive [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Infinity and continuity used to be philosophy, but are now mathematics [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
The definition of order needs a transitive relation, to leap over infinite intermediate terms [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Any founded, non-repeating series all reachable in steps will satisfy Peano's axioms [Russell]
'0', 'number' and 'successor' cannot be defined by Peano's axioms [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
A number is something which characterises collections of the same size [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
What matters is the logical interrelation of mathematical terms, not their intrinsic nature [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Maybe numbers are adjectives, since 'ten men' grammatically resembles 'white men' [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
For Russell, numbers are sets of equivalent sets [Russell, by Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / e. Psychologism
There is always something psychological about inference [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Existence can only be asserted of something described, not of something named [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
Classes are logical fictions, made from defining characteristics [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
If a relation is symmetrical and transitive, it has to be reflexive [Russell]
'Asymmetry' is incompatible with its converse; a is husband of b, so b can't be husband of a [Russell]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
The essence of individuality is beyond description, and hence irrelevant to science [Russell]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Inferring q from p only needs p to be true, and 'not-p or q' to be true [Russell]
All forms of implication are expressible as truth-functions [Russell]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary [Russell]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Mathematically expressed propositions are true of the world, but how to interpret them? [Russell]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
To the four causes Plato adds a fifth, the idea which guided the event [Seneca]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
If everything can be measured, try measuring the size of a man's soul [Seneca]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida]
For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida]
Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida]
The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida]
Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning]
Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Referring to a person, and speaking about him, are very different [Seneca]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions are mainly verbal expressions of true or false, and perhaps also symbolic thoughts [Russell]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Trouble in life comes from copying other people, which is following convention instead of reason [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Humans acquired the concept of virtue from an analogy with bodily health and strength [Seneca, by Allen]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
We know death, which is like before birth; ceasing to be and never beginning are the same [Seneca]
Living is nothing wonderful; what matters is to die well [Seneca]
It is as silly to lament ceasing to be as to lament not having lived in the remote past [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Is anything sweeter than valuing yourself more when you find you are loved? [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Selfishness does not produce happiness; to live for yourself, live for others [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
A man is as unhappy as he has convinced himself he is [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Life is like a play - it is the quality that matters, not the length [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
We are scared of death - except when we are immersed in pleasure! [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
The whole point of pleasure-seeking is novelty, and abandoning established ways [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
Nature doesn't give us virtue; we must unremittingly pursue it, as a training and an art [Seneca]
Living contrary to nature is like rowing against the stream [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Character is ruined by not looking back over our pasts, since the future rests on the past [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
It's no good winning lots of fights, if you are then conquered by your own temper [Seneca]
Excessive curiosity is a form of intemperance [Seneca]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
To govern used to mean to serve, not to rule; rulers did not test their powers over those who bestowed it [Seneca]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
One joy of learning is making teaching possible [Seneca]
Both teachers and pupils should aim at one thing - the improvement of the pupil [Seneca]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Suicide may be appropriate even when it is not urgent, if there are few reasons against it [Seneca]
If we control our own death, no one has power over us [Seneca]
Sometimes we have a duty not to commit suicide, for those we love [Seneca]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Does time exist on its own? Did anything precede it? Did it pre-exist the cosmos? [Seneca]