Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'works' and 'Psychosemantics'

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70 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Ideals and metaphysics are practical, not imaginative or speculative [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida]
Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning]
Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida]
Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida]
We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel]
True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Truth is a relation to a whole of organised knowledge in the collection of rational minds [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida]
'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties [Fodor]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
All knowledge rests on a fundamental unity between the knower and what is known [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial [Fodor]
Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned [Fodor]
Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals [Fodor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
The ultimate test for truth is the systematic interdependence in nature [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining [Fodor]
Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Fodor, by Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida]
We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida]
For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida]
Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida]
The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida]
Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning]
Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
What is distinctive of human life is the desire for self-improvement [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Hedonism offers no satisfaction, because what we desire is self-betterment [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
Politics is compromises, which seem supported by a social contract, but express the will of no one [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
The ideal is a society in which all citizens are ladies and gentlemen [Green,TH]
Enfranchisement is an end in itself; it makes a person moral, and gives a basis for respect [Green,TH]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
The good is identified by the capacities of its participants [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
A true state is only unified and stabilised by acknowledging individuality [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
People only develop their personality through co-operation with the social whole [Green,TH, by Muirhead]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
If something develops, its true nature is embodied in its end [Green,TH]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
God is the ideal end of the mature mind's final development [Green,TH]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
God is the realisation of the possibilities of each man's self [Green,TH]