89 ideas
| 21887 | Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida] |
| 21888 | Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida] |
| 21896 | Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May] |
| 21893 | Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida] |
| 21634 | Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber] |
| 18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
| 21666 | 'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber] |
| 21892 | Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida] |
| 20925 | Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
| 20934 | Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
| 21895 | Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida] |
| 21934 | The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21881 | We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida] |
| 21882 | Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida] |
| 21883 | Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida] |
| 4756 | Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel] |
| 21877 | True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida] |
| 18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
| 18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
| 18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
| 18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
| 18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
| 18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
| 18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
| 18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
| 18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
| 21640 | 'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber] |
| 18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
| 18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
| 21657 | Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber] |
| 21878 | Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida] |
| 21889 | 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida] |
| 21879 | Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida] |
| 21653 | Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber] |
| 21636 | 'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber] |
| 21637 | If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber] |
| 21643 | The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber] |
| 21644 | Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber] |
| 21646 | The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber] |
| 18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
| 21665 | The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber] |
| 21649 | How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber] |
| 21647 | Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber] |
| 21648 | Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber] |
| 21664 | Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber] |
| 18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
| 21660 | Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber] |
| 18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
| 21661 | There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber] |
| 18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
| 18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
| 18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
| 18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
| 18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
| 18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
| 18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
| 18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
| 18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
| 21652 | Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber] |
| 18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
| 21663 | Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber] |
| 18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
| 21890 | Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida] |
| 18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
| 21880 | 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida] |
| 21894 | Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida] |
| 21886 | Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida] |
| 21930 | For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida] |
| 21884 | Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida] |
| 21935 | The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida] |
| 21933 | Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21654 | The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber] |
| 21641 | Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber] |
| 21931 | 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
| 21885 | Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida] |
| 21638 | Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber] |
| 21658 | Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber] |
| 21659 | 'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber] |
| 21655 | Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber] |
| 21656 | Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber] |
| 18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
| 18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
| 21635 | Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber] |
| 21662 | Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber] |
| 21645 | 'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber] |
| 21639 | 'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber] |
| 21891 | The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida] |
| 18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
| 18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |