70 ideas
21887 | Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida] |
21888 | Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida] |
21896 | Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May] |
21893 | Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida] |
21892 | Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida] |
20934 | Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
20925 | Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
21895 | Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida] |
21934 | The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21881 | We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida] |
21883 | Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida] |
21882 | Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida] |
21616 | Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions [Williamson] |
21623 | True and false are not symmetrical; false is more complex, involving negation [Williamson] |
4756 | Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel] |
21877 | True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida] |
21602 | Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored [Williamson] |
21611 | Formal semantics defines validity as truth preserved in every model [Williamson] |
21606 | 'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false [Williamson] |
21605 | Excluded Middle is 'A or not A' in the object language [Williamson] |
21878 | Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida] |
21889 | 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida] |
21879 | Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida] |
21612 | Or-elimination is 'Argument by Cases'; it shows how to derive C from 'A or B' [Williamson] |
21599 | A sorites stops when it collides with an opposite sorites [Williamson] |
21596 | Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic [Williamson] |
21601 | A vague term can refer to very precise elements [Williamson] |
21589 | When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic [Williamson] |
21629 | Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson] |
21591 | Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson] |
21619 | If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson] |
21620 | The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson] |
21622 | If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson] |
9120 | Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson] |
21614 | The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept [Williamson] |
21617 | We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition [Williamson] |
21618 | If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson] |
21625 | The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed [Williamson] |
21590 | Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
21609 | Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid' [Williamson] |
21610 | Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic [Williamson] |
21613 | Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
21592 | Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics [Williamson] |
21603 | You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague [Williamson] |
21604 | Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected [Williamson] |
21607 | Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided [Williamson] |
21608 | Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation [Williamson] |
21633 | Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different [Williamson] |
21630 | If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson] |
21632 | A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries [Williamson] |
21621 | We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson] |
21627 | We have inexact knowledge when we include margins of error [Williamson] |
21626 | Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson] |
21890 | Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida] |
21880 | 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida] |
21631 | To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson] |
21600 | 'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect [Williamson] |
21884 | Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida] |
21935 | The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida] |
21930 | For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida] |
21933 | Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21894 | Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida] |
21886 | Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida] |
21931 | 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21885 | Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida] |
21615 | References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful [Williamson] |
18038 | The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false [Williamson] |
21624 | It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson] |
3284 | There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe) [Nagel] |
21891 | The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida] |