56 ideas
21887 | Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida] |
21888 | Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida] |
21896 | Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May] |
21893 | Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida] |
21892 | Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida] |
20925 | Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
20934 | Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J] |
21895 | Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida] |
21934 | The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21883 | Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida] |
21882 | Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida] |
21881 | We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida] |
4756 | Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel] |
21877 | True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida] |
21889 | 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida] |
21878 | Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida] |
21879 | Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida] |
19701 | Fallibilism is consistent with dogmatism or scepticism, and is not alternative to them [Dougherty] |
19700 | It is best to see the fallibility in the reasons, rather than in the agents or the knowledge [Dougherty] |
19702 | We can't normally say that we know something 'but it might be false' [Dougherty] |
21890 | Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida] |
21880 | 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida] |
21886 | Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida] |
21930 | For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida] |
21884 | Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida] |
21935 | The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida] |
21933 | Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21894 | Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida] |
21931 | 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning] |
21885 | Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida] |
23590 | Criminal responsibility can be fully assigned to each member of a group [Walzer] |
23578 | Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer] |
23564 | Deep ethical theory is very controversial, but we have to live with higher ethical practice [Walzer] |
21891 | The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida] |
23568 | If whole states possess rights, there can be social relations between states [Walzer] |
23571 | States can rightly pre-empt real and serious threats [Walzer] |
23572 | Just wars are self-defence, or a rightful intercession in another's troubles [Walzer] |
23581 | The aim of reprisals is to enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |
23582 | Reprisal is defensible, as an alternative to war [Walzer] |
23588 | With nuclear weapons we have a permanent supreme emergency (which is unstable) [Walzer] |
23580 | States need not endure attacks passively, and successful reprisals are legitimate [Walzer] |
23587 | Nuclear bombs are not for normal war; they undermine the 'just war', with a new morality [Walzer] |
23567 | Even non-violent intrusive acts between states count as aggression, if they justify resistance [Walzer] |
23570 | The only good reason for fighting is in defence of rights [Walzer] |
23573 | For moral reasons, a just war must be a limited war [Walzer] |
23577 | Napoleon said 'I don't care about the deaths of a million men' [Walzer] |
23593 | Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello are independent; unjust wars can be fought in a just way [Walzer] |
23574 | The duties and moral status of loyal and obedient soldiers is the same in defence and aggression [Walzer] |
23575 | We can't blame soldiers for anything they do which clearly promotes victory [Walzer] |
23584 | Rejecting Combatant Equality allows just soldiers to be harsher, even to the extreme [Walzer] |
23589 | Kidnapped sailors and volunteers have different obligations to the passengers [Walzer] |
23614 | Even aggressor soldiers are not criminals, so they have equal rights with their opponents [Walzer] |
23579 | Soldiers will only protect civilians if they feel safe from them [Walzer] |
23586 | What matters in war is unacceptable targets, not unacceptable weapons [Walzer] |
23591 | If the oppressor is cruel, nonviolence is either surrender, or a mere gesture [Walzer] |
23592 | We can only lead war towards peace if we firmly enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |