Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'The Trouble with Possible Worlds' and 'Set Theory and Its Philosophy'

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48 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
21887 Derrida focuses on other philosophers, rather than on science [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
21888 Philosophy is just a linguistic display [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
21896 Philosophy aims to build foundations for thought [Derrida, by May]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
21893 Philosophy is necessarily metaphorical, and its writing is aesthetic [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
21892 Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida]
20925 Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
20934 Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
21895 Structuralism destroys awareness of dynamic meaning [Derrida]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
21934 The idea of being as persistent presence, and meaning as conscious intelligibility, are self-destructive [Derrida, by Glendinning]
21883 Sincerity can't be verified, so fiction infuses speech, and hence reality also [Derrida]
21882 Sentences are contradictory, as they have opposite meanings in some contexts [Derrida]
21881 We aim to explore the limits of expression (as in Mallarmé's poetry) [Derrida]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
15784 The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
15787 Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
4756 Derrida says that all truth-talk is merely metaphor [Derrida, by Engel]
21877 True thoughts are inaccessible, in the subconscious, prior to speech or writing [Derrida]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
10702 Set theory's three roles: taming the infinite, subject-matter of mathematics, and modes of reasoning [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
10713 Usually the only reason given for accepting the empty set is convenience [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
13044 Infinity: There is at least one limit level [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
10708 Nowadays we derive our conception of collections from the dependence between them [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
13546 The 'limitation of size' principles say whether properties collectivise depends on the number of objects [Potter]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
10707 Mereology elides the distinction between the cards in a pack and the suits [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10704 We can formalize second-order formation rules, but not inference rules [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
21878 Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida]
21889 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
21879 Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 3. Proof from Assumptions
10703 Supposing axioms (rather than accepting them) give truths, but they are conditional [Potter]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
10712 If set theory didn't found mathematics, it is still needed to count infinite sets [Potter]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
17882 It is remarkable that all natural number arithmetic derives from just the Peano Axioms [Potter]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
13043 A relation is a set consisting entirely of ordered pairs [Potter]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
15792 Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
13042 If dependence is well-founded, with no infinite backward chains, this implies substances [Potter]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
13041 Collections have fixed members, but fusions can be carved in innumerable ways [Potter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
10709 Priority is a modality, arising from collections and members [Potter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15795 Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
15796 Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
15794 If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
21890 Heidegger showed that passing time is the key to consciousness [Derrida]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
21880 'Tacit theory' controls our thinking (which is why Freud is important) [Derrida]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
21894 Madness and instability ('the demonic hyperbole') lurks in all language [Derrida]
21886 Meanings depend on differences and contrasts [Derrida]
21930 For Aristotle all proper nouns must have a single sense, which is the purpose of language [Derrida]
21884 Capacity for repetitions is the hallmark of language [Derrida]
21935 The sign is only conceivable as a movement between elusive presences [Derrida]
21933 Writing functions even if the sender or the receiver are absent [Derrida, by Glendinning]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
21931 'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
21885 Words exist in 'spacing', so meanings are never synchronic except in writing [Derrida]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
21891 The good is implicitly violent (against evil), so there is no pure good [Derrida]