Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophy of Mind', 'Nicomachean Ethics' and 'The Justification of Deduction'

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307 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious [Aristotle]
Wisdom does not study happiness, because it is not concerned with processes [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Aristotle thinks human life is not important enough to spend a whole life on it [Nagel on Aristotle]
Wise people can contemplate alone, though co-operation helps [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Most people are readier to submit to compulsion than to argument [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Trained minds never expect more precision than is possible [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
The object of scientific knowledge is what is necessary [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Contraries are by definition as far distant as possible from one another [Aristotle]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Piety requires us to honour truth above our friends [Aristotle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
A statement is true if all the data are in harmony with it [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett]
In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett]
Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim]
Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
Eternal white is no whiter than temporary white, and it is the same with goodness [Aristotle]
It is meaningless to speak of 'man-himself', because it has the same definition as plain 'man' [Aristotle]
How will a vision of pure goodness make someone a better doctor? [Aristotle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
To perceive or think is to be conscious of our existence [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
It is enough if we refute the objections and leave common opinions undisturbed [Aristotle]
If everyone believes it, it is true [Aristotle]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuition grasps the definitions that can't be proved [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Everything that receives nourishment has a vegetative soul, with it own distinctive excellence [Aristotle]
In a controlled person the receptive part of the soul is obedient, and it is in harmony in the virtuous [Aristotle]
The irrational psuché is persuadable by reason - shown by our criticism and encouragement of people [Aristotle]
If beings are dominated by appetite, this can increase so much that it drives out reason [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim]
Experiment requires mental causation [Kim]
Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either truly separate, or merely described that way [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pain has no reference or content [Kim]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim]
Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim]
We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
It would seem that the thinking part is the individual self [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Aristotle never discusses free will [Aristotle, by MacIntyre]
For an action to be 'free', it must be deliberate as well as unconstrained [Aristotle, by Leibniz]
A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Aristotle assesses whether people are responsible, and if they are it was voluntary [Aristotle, by Zagzebski]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim]
What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim]
Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim]
Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim]
Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim]
What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim]
Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim]
Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim]
We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim]
Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim]
Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The attainment of truth is the task of the intellectual part of the soul [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others [Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim]
Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim]
A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim]
Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse on Aristotle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Assume our reason is in two parts, one for permanent first principles, and one for variable things [Aristotle]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim]
The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim]
Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim]
Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim]
Content may match several things in the environment [Kim]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim]
Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim]
If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Choice is not explained by the will, but by the operation of reason when it judges what is good [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent [Aristotle]
Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self [Aristotle]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire [Aristotle]
Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Aristotle, by Cottingham]
Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge [Aristotle]
A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular [Aristotle]
Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
We deliberate about means, not ends [Aristotle]
Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct [Aristotle]
Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them [Aristotle]
One cannot be prudent without being good [Aristotle]
The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues [Aristotle]
Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings [Aristotle]
Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Bad people are just ignorant of what they ought to do [Aristotle]
Some people are good at forming opinions, but bad at making moral choices [Aristotle]
For Socrates virtues are principles, involving knowledge, but we say they only imply the principle of practical reason [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
If you repent of an act done through ignorance, you acted involuntarily, not non-voluntarily [Aristotle]
For Aristotle responsibility seems negative, in the absence of force or ignorance [Irwin on Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
We choose things for their fineness, their advantage, or for pleasure [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
We aim not to identify goodness, but to be good [Aristotle]
There is no fixed art of good conduct, and each situation is different, as in navigation [Aristotle]
We must take for granted that we should act according to right principle [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Perhaps we get a better account of happiness as the good for man if we know his function [Aristotle]
If bodily organs have functions, presumably the whole person has one [Aristotle]
To eat vast amounts is unnatural, since natural desire is to replenish the deficiency [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
For the great-souled man it is sometimes better to be dead [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Aristotle said there are two levels of virtue - the conventional and the intellectual [Taylor,R on Aristotle]
Moral acts are so varied that they must be convention, not nature [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
We desire final things just for themselves, and not for the sake of something else [Aristotle]
How can an action be intrinsically good if it is a means to 'eudaimonia'? [Ackrill on Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Each named function has a distinctive excellence attached to it [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Excess and deficiency are bad for virtue, just as they are for bodily health [Aristotle]
Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The more virtuous and happy a person is, the worse the prospect becomes of ending life [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
All altruism is an extension of self-love [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Only lovable things are loved, and they must be good, or pleasant, or useful [Aristotle]
Most people want to be loved rather than to love, because they desire honour [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Good people enjoy virtuous action, just as musicians enjoy beautiful melodies [Aristotle]
Slaves can't be happy, because they lack freedom [Aristotle]
Oxen, horses and children cannot be happy, because they cannot perform fine deeds [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
The best people exercise their virtue towards others, rather than to themselves [Aristotle]
Self-love benefits ourselves, and also helps others [Aristotle]
For Aristotle, true self-love is love of the higher parts of one's soul [Aristotle, by Annas]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
Each category of existence has its own good, so one Good cannot unite them [Aristotle]
There should be one science of the one Good, but there are many overlapping sciences [Aristotle]
The good is 'that at which all things aim' [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Intelligence and sight, and some pleasures and honours, are candidates for being good in themselves [Aristotle]
Goods are external, of the soul, and of the body; those of the soul (such as action) come first [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is not the Good, and not every pleasure is desirable [Aristotle]
The masses believe, not unreasonably, that the good is pleasure [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Clearly perfect conduct will involve both good intention and good action [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
Wealth is not the good, because it is only a means [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness seems to involve virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom, or pleasure, or external goods [Aristotle]
You can be good while asleep, or passive, or in pain [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Does Aristotle say eudaimonia is the aim, or that it ought to be? [McDowell on Aristotle]
Some good and evil can happen to the dead, just as the living may be unaware of a disaster [Aristotle]
Eudaimonia is said to only have final value, where reason and virtue are also useful [Aristotle, by Orsi]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Aristotle is unsure about eudaimonia because he is unsure what people are [Nagel on Aristotle]
Goods like pleasure are chosen partly for happiness, but happiness is chosen just for itself [Aristotle]
Happiness is perfect and self-sufficient, the end of all action [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The best life is that of the intellect, since that is in the fullest sense the man [Aristotle]
Happiness needs total goodness and a complete life [Aristotle]
If happiness can be achieved by study and effort, then it is open to anyone who is not corrupt [Aristotle]
Happiness is activity in accordance with complete virtue, for a whole life, with adequate external goods [Aristotle]
The happy life is in accordance with goodness, which implies seriousness [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
God feels one simple pleasure forever [Aristotle]
Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones [Aristotle]
There are pleasures of the soul (e.g. civic honour, and learning) and of the body [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
If we criticise bodily pleasures as licentious and bad, why do we consider their opposite, pain, to be bad? [Aristotle]
Nobody would choose the mentality of a child, even if they had the greatest childish pleasures [Aristotle]
There are many things we would want even if they brought no pleasure [Aristotle]
It is right to pursue pleasure, because it enhances life, and life is a thing to choose [Aristotle]
If happiness were mere amusement it wouldn't be worth a lifetime's effort [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
Some things are not naturally pleasant, but become so through disease or depravity [Aristotle]
While replenishing we even enjoy unpleasant things, but only absolute pleasures when we are replenished [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Character is revealed by the pleasures and pains people feel [Aristotle]
Feeling inappropriate pleasure or pain affects conduct, and is central to morality [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
The greater the pleasure, the greater the hindrance to thought [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Nobody would choose all the good things in world, if the price was loss of identity [Aristotle]
A man is his own best friend; therefore he ought to love himself best [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 2. Hedonism
Licentiousness concerns the animal-like pleasures of touch and taste [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue [Aristotle]
Many pleasures are relative to a person, but some love what is pleasant by nature, and virtue is like that [Aristotle]
Aristotle must hold that virtuous King Priam's life can be marred, but not ruined [Hursthouse on Aristotle]
Feelings are vital to virtue, but virtue requires choice, which feelings lack [Kosman on Aristotle]
Actions are not virtuous because of their quality, but because of the way they are done [Aristotle]
If virtues are not feelings or faculties, then they must be dispositions [Aristotle]
Virtue is the feeling of emotions that accord with one's perception of value [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
Virtue is a purposive mean disposition, which follows a rational principle and prudent judgment [Aristotle]
Acts may be forgivable if particular facts (rather than principles) are unknown [Aristotle]
A life of moral virtue brings human happiness, but not divine happiness [Aristotle]
There are six categories of particular cirumstance affecting an action [Aristotle]
An act is involuntary if the particular facts (esp. circumstances and effect) are unknown [Aristotle]
People who perform just acts unwillingly or ignorantly are still not just [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
The two main parts of the soul give rise to two groups of virtues - intellectual, and moral [Aristotle]
How can good actions breed virtues, if you need to be virtuous to perform good actions? [Aristotle]
If a thing has excellence, this makes the thing good, and means it functions well [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Aristotle, by Achtenberg]
Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round [Aristotle]
We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Aristotle neglects the place of rules in the mature virtuous person [Annas on Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / a. Natural virtue
We are partly responsible for our own dispositions and virtues [Aristotle]
Moral virtue is not natural, because its behaviour can be changed, unlike a falling stone [Aristotle]
Dispositions to virtue are born in us, but without intelligence they can be harmful [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
The end of virtue is what is right and honourable or fine [Aristotle]
A person is good if they act from choice, and for the sake of the actions in themselves [Aristotle]
Existence is desirable if one is conscious of one's own goodness [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
We acquire virtues by habitually performing good deeds [Aristotle]
True education is training from infancy to have correct feelings [Aristotle]
Nature enables us to be virtuous, but habit develops virtue in us [Aristotle]
Like activities produce like dispositions, so we must give the right quality to the activity [Aristotle]
We must practise virtuous acts because practice actually teaches us the nature of virtue [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
People can break into the circle of virtue and good action, by chance, or with help [Aristotle]
We acquire virtue by the repeated performance of just and temperate acts [Aristotle]
Associating with good people can be a training in virtue [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
A person of good character sees the truth about what is actually fine and pleasant [Aristotle]
People develop their characters through the activities they pursue [Aristotle]
When people speak of justice they mean a disposition of character to behave justly [Aristotle]
It is very hard to change a person's character traits by argument [Aristotle]
Character can be heroic, excellent, controlled, uncontrolled, bad, or brutish [Aristotle, by Urmson]
The three states of character to avoid are vice, 'akrasia' and brutishness [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The mean implies that vices are opposed to one another, not to virtue [Aristotle, by Annas]
Virtues are destroyed by the excess and preserved by the mean [Aristotle]
Aristotle aims at happiness by depressing emotions to a harmless mean [Nietzsche on Aristotle]
The mean is relative to the individual (diet, for example) [Aristotle]
Skills are only well performed if they observe the mean [Aristotle]
One drink a day is moderation, but very drunk once a week could exhibit the mean [Urmson on Aristotle]
In most normal situations it is not appropriate to have any feelings at all [Urmson on Aristotle]
We must tune our feelings to be right in every way [Aristotle]
The mean is always right, and the extremes are always wrong [Aristotle]
The vices to which we are most strongly pulled are most opposed to the mean [Aristotle]
To make one's anger exactly appropriate to a situation is very difficult [Aristotle]
Patient people are indignant, but only appropriately, as their reason prescribes [Aristotle]
The sincere man is praiseworthy, because truth is the mean between boasting and irony [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
At times we ought to feel angry, and we ought to desire health and learning [Aristotle]
It is foolish not to be angry when it is appropriate [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
There is no right time or place or way or person for the committing of adultery; it is just wrong [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Nowadays we (unlike Aristotle) seem agreed that someone can have one virtue but lack others [Williams,B on Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Gods exist in a state which is morally superior to virtue [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
The word 'unjust' describes law-breaking and exploitation [Aristotle]
Between friends there is no need for justice [Aristotle]
Justice concerns our behaviour in dealing with other people [Aristotle]
What emotion is displayed in justice, and what are its deficiency and excess? [Urmson on Aristotle]
Particular justice concerns specific temptations, but universal justice concerns the whole character [Aristotle]
Justice is whatever creates or preserves social happiness [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Strictly speaking, a courageous person is one who does not fear an honourable death [Aristotle]
True courage is an appropriate response to a dangerous situation [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Honour is clearly the greatest external good [Aristotle]
If you aim at honour, you make yourself dependent on the people to whom you wish to be superior [Aristotle, by Williams,B]
Honour depends too much on the person who awards it [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
Lower animals cannot be happy, because they cannot contemplate [Aristotle]
Contemplation (with the means to achieve it) is the perfect happiness for man [Aristotle]
Only contemplation is sought for its own sake; practical activity always offers some gain [Aristotle]
The intellectual life is divine in comparison with ordinary human life [Aristotle]
The gods live, but action is unworthy of them, so that only leaves contemplation? [Aristotle]
We should aspire to immortality, and live by what is highest in us [Aristotle]
The more people contemplate, the happier they are [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
The fine deeds required for happiness need external resources, like friends or wealth [Aristotle]
A man can't be happy if he is ugly, or of low birth, or alone and childless [Aristotle]
It is nonsense to say a good person is happy even if they are being tortured or suffering disaster [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
The virtue of generosity requires money [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Aristotle does not confine supreme friendship to moral heroes [Cooper,JM on Aristotle]
For Aristotle in the best friendships the binding force is some excellence of character [Cooper,JM on Aristotle]
Bad men can have friendships of utility or pleasure, but only good men can be true friends [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
'Enkrateia' (control) means abiding by one's own calculations [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Society collapses if people cannot rely on exchanging good for good and evil for evil [Aristotle]
Even more than a social being, man is a pairing and family being [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Man is by nature a social being [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
A bad political constitution (especially a tyranny) makes friendship almost impossible [Aristotle]
Political science aims at the highest good, which involves creating virtue in citizens [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The aim of legislators, and of a good constitution, is to create good citizens [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / b. Legislature
We hold that every piece of legislation is just [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Democracy is the best constitution for friendship, because it encourages equality [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Friendship holds communities together, and lawgivers value it more than justice [Aristotle]
Friendship is based on a community of sharing [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Aristotle thought slavery is just if it is both necessary and natural [Aristotle, by Sandel]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
For Aristotle, debates about justice are debates about the good life [Aristotle, by Sandel]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural justice is the same everywhere, and does not (unlike legal justice) depend on acceptance [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Intellectual virtue arises from instruction (and takes time), whereas moral virtue result from habit [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
A suicide embraces death to run away from hardships, rather than because it is a fine deed [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
Aristotle needed to distinguish teleological description from teleological explanation [Irwin on Aristotle]
The nature of any given thing is determined by its end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Types of cause are nature, necessity and chance, and mind and human agency [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
We all assume immortality is impossible [Aristotle]