13 ideas
8526 | We might treat both tropes and substances as fundamental, so we can't presume it is just tropes [Daly] |
8527 | More than one trope (even identical ones!) can occupy the same location [Daly] |
8528 | If tropes are linked by the existence of concurrence, a special relation is needed to link them all [Daly] |
12432 | Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale] |
12434 | Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale] |
12435 | The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale] |
12433 | If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale] |
12436 | Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale] |
8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |