17 ideas
| 3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
| 3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
| 3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
| 3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
| 3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
| 3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
| 12699 | A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz] |
| 12700 | Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz] |
| 12736 | If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber] |
| 3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
| 3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
| 12698 | Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz] |
| 8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
| 8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
| 8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
| 8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
| 4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |