30 ideas
| 4608 | Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil] |
| 4880 | Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett] |
| 4873 | What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep? [Dennett] |
| 4881 | Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett] |
| 4983 | There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson] |
| 4875 | We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett] |
| 3529 | Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin] |
| 2307 | Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 5497 | Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 4081 | Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane] |
| 2321 | If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 3404 | Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 16041 | Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson] |
| 4879 | There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett] |
| 4876 | Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett] |
| 6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
| 3429 | Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 4878 | The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett] |
| 4874 | The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett] |
| 4882 | Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language [Dennett] |
| 4872 | Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain [Dennett] |
| 8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
| 3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
| 3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |
| 8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
| 8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
| 8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
| 4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |
| 4877 | Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster? [Dennett] |