15 ideas
12312 | The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi] |
8967 | Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe] |
8965 | Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe] |
10937 | Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami] |
12308 | In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi] |
12303 | Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi] |
8968 | If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe] |
8966 | Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe] |
8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
12307 | Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi] |
12310 | Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi] |
4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |