19 ideas
| 14633 | How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson] |
| 14635 | An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson] |
| 14632 | Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson] |
| 14631 | How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson] |
| 23865 | Morality would improve if people could pursue private interests [Weil] |
| 23866 | In oppressive societies the scope of actual control is extended by a religion of power [Weil] |
| 23871 | No central authority can initiate decentralisation [Weil] |
| 23867 | After a bloody revolution the group which already had the power comes to the fore [Weil] |
| 23870 | Decentralisation is only possible by co-operation between strong and weak - which is absurd [Weil] |
| 23863 | Only individual people of good will can achieve social progress [Weil] |
| 23869 | In the least evil societies people can think, control community life, and be autonomous [Weil] |
| 23861 | Marx showed that capitalist oppression, because of competition, is unstoppable [Weil] |
| 23868 | The pleasure of completing tasks motivates just as well as the whip of slavery [Weil] |
| 23864 | Inequality could easily be mitigated, if it were not for the struggle for power [Weil] |
| 8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
| 8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
| 8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
| 8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
| 4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |