Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causes and Counterfactuals', 'Philosophy of Nature (Encylopedia II)' and 'Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents'

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Metaphysics is the lattice which makes incoming material intelligible [Hegel]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
All revolutions result from spirit changing its categories, to achieve a deeper understanding [Hegel]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]
Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]