101 ideas
23248 | Early empiricists said reason was just a useless concept introduced by philosophers [Galen, by Frede,M] |
3426 | If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim] |
22309 | An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley] |
6717 | Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley] |
3431 | Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim] |
18876 | Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron] |
3437 | 'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim] |
3430 | Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim] |
3432 | Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim] |
3434 | Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim] |
3436 | Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim] |
6715 | Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley] |
6719 | No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley] |
6714 | Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley] |
6729 | Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley] |
16636 | A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley] |
3406 | Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG] |
6722 | Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley] |
6724 | The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley] |
6723 | The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley] |
6732 | When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley] |
6726 | No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
6728 | Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley] |
6727 | Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley] |
6495 | Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley] |
6720 | Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley] |
3368 | Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim] |
3392 | Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim] |
3396 | Experiment requires mental causation [Kim] |
3397 | Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim] |
23636 | Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley] |
6736 | I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley] |
6713 | If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley] |
3367 | Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim] |
6491 | Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H] |
3365 | Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim] |
3360 | Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim] |
3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
3389 | Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim] |
3391 | Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG] |
6711 | The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley] |
10581 | I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley] |
3422 | Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim] |
3412 | How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim] |
3363 | We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim] |
6721 | Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley] |
3409 | Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim] |
3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
3359 | Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim] |
3369 | Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim] |
3428 | Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim] |
3380 | Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim] |
3371 | Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim] |
3372 | Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim] |
3373 | Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim] |
3370 | What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim] |
3379 | Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim] |
3388 | Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim] |
3384 | The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim] |
3393 | How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim] |
3427 | Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim] |
3439 | Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim] |
3424 | Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim] |
3376 | We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim] |
3362 | Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim] |
3413 | Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim] |
3374 | Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim] |
3433 | The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim] |
3377 | Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim] |
3438 | Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim] |
3440 | Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim] |
3375 | If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim] |
3411 | How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim] |
3386 | Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim] |
3394 | Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim] |
3387 | A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim] |
3410 | Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim] |
3382 | A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim] |
3383 | The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim] |
3408 | Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim] |
3420 | Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim] |
3418 | 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim] |
3421 | Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim] |
3416 | Content may match several things in the environment [Kim] |
3419 | Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim] |
3417 | Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim] |
6716 | Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley] |
6718 | I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley] |
3403 | We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim] |
3402 | If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim] |
6731 | No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley] |
6730 | We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley] |
3401 | A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim] |
3407 | Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim] |
15861 | The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley] |
6734 | If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley] |
6735 | All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley] |
6733 | I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley] |
6737 | Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley] |