11 ideas
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |
16709 | Some people return to scholastic mysterious qualities, disguising them as 'forces' [Leibniz] |