Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causes and Counterfactuals', 'Logic in Mathematics' and 'The Problem of the Soul'

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48 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Philosophy needs wisdom about who we are, as well as how we ought to be [Flanagan]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
We resist science partly because it can't provide ethical wisdom [Flanagan]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
Frege suggested that mathematics should only accept stipulative definitions [Frege, by Gupta]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
We must be clear about every premise and every law used in a proof [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic not only proves things, but also reveals logical relations between them [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
Does some mathematical reasoning (such as mathematical induction) not belong to logic? [Frege]
The closest subject to logic is mathematics, which does little apart from drawing inferences [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 8. Theories in Logic
'Theorems' are both proved, and used in proofs [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Tracing inference backwards closes in on a small set of axioms and postulates [Frege]
The essence of mathematics is the kernel of primitive truths on which it rests [Frege]
A truth can be an axiom in one system and not in another [Frege]
Axioms are truths which cannot be doubted, and for which no proof is needed [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
To create order in mathematics we need a full system, guided by patterns of inference [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
If principles are provable, they are theorems; if not, they are axioms [Frege]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
Only you can have your subjective experiences because only you are hooked up to your nervous system [Flanagan]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
The self is an abstraction which magnifies important aspects of autobiography [Flanagan]
We are not born with a self; we develop a self through living [Flanagan]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
For Buddhists a fixed self is a morally dangerous illusion [Flanagan]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling [Flanagan]
Free will is held to give us a whole list of desirable capacities for living [Flanagan]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
People believe they have free will that circumvents natural law, but only an incorporeal mind could do this [Flanagan]
We only think of ourselves as having free will because we first thought of God that way [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
People largely came to believe in dualism because it made human agents free [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them [Flanagan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser [Flanagan]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
Emotions are usually very apt, rather than being non-rational and fickle [Flanagan]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
We need definitions to cram retrievable sense into a signed receptacle [Frege]
We use signs to mark receptacles for complex senses [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
A sign won't gain sense just from being used in sentences with familiar components [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege]
A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Intellectualism admires the 'principled actor', non-intellectualism admires the 'good character' [Flanagan]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
Cognitivists think morals are discovered by reason [Flanagan]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing [Flanagan]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]
Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 3. Hinduism
The Hindu doctrine of reincarnation only appeared in the eighth century CE [Flanagan]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The idea of the soul gets some support from the scientific belief in essential 'natural kinds' [Flanagan]