Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causes and Counterfactuals', 'On Concept and Object' and 'Sets and Numbers'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

22 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
17824 The master science is physical objects divided into sets [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
4975 A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
9949 There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
17825 Set theory (unlike the Peano postulates) can explain why multiplication is commutative [Maddy]
17826 Standardly, numbers are said to be sets, which is neat ontology and epistemology [Maddy]
17828 Numbers are properties of sets, just as lengths are properties of physical objects [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
17827 Sets exist where their elements are, but numbers are more like universals [Maddy]
17830 Number theory doesn't 'reduce' to set theory, because sets have number properties [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
17823 If mathematical objects exist, how can we know them, and which objects are they? [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
17829 Number words are unusual as adjectives; we don't say 'is five', and numbers always come first [Maddy]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18995 Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
10317 It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
10535 Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
9839 Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / b. Concepts are linguistic
4973 As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
9167 Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
4974 For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
8430 Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
8396 Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]
8429 Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
8428 Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
4781 Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]