Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events as property exemplifications', 'The Mystery of Consciousness' and '06: Romans'

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20 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
10369 How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated [Kim, by Schaffer,J]
8976 If events are ordered triples of items, such things seem to be sets, and hence abstract [Simons on Kim]
8975 Events cannot be merely ordered triples, but must specify the link between the elements [Kim, by Simons]
8974 Events are composed of an object with an attribute at a time [Kim, by Simons]
8977 Since properties like self-identity and being 2+2=4 are timeless, Kim must restrict his properties [Simons on Kim]
8980 Kim's theory results in too many events [Simons on Kim]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
5791 Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
5799 Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
5790 A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
5792 Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
5786 A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
5794 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
5795 There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
5788 The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
5789 I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
5798 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
5787 There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
5797 The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
5796 If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
20695 God's eternal power and deity are clearly seen in what has been created [Paul]