108 ideas
24084 | Seeing with other eyes is more egoism, but exploring other perspectives leads to objectivity [Nietzsche] |
3426 | If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim] |
24092 | I tell the truth, even if it is repulsive [Nietzsche] |
24114 | The pain in truth is when it destroys a belief [Nietzsche] |
24104 | We don't create logic, time and space! The mind obeys laws because they are true [Nietzsche] |
24112 | To think about being we must have an opinion about what it is [Nietzsche] |
3431 | Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim] |
3437 | 'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim] |
3430 | Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim] |
3432 | Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim] |
3434 | Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim] |
3436 | Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim] |
24089 | Essences are fictions needed for beings who represent things [Nietzsche] |
3406 | Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG] |
24115 | There is no proof that we forget things - only that we can't recall [Nietzsche] |
3368 | Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim] |
3392 | Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim] |
3396 | Experiment requires mental causation [Kim] |
3397 | Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim] |
24090 | Our inclinations would not conflict if we were a unity; we imagine unity for our multiplicity [Nietzsche] |
3367 | Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim] |
3365 | Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim] |
3360 | Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim] |
3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
3389 | Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim] |
3391 | Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG] |
3422 | Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim] |
3412 | How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim] |
3363 | We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim] |
24099 | We contain many minds, which fight for the 'I' of the mind [Nietzsche] |
3409 | Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim] |
3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
3359 | Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim] |
3369 | Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim] |
3428 | Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim] |
3380 | Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim] |
3370 | What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim] |
3371 | Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim] |
3372 | Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim] |
3373 | Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim] |
3379 | Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim] |
3388 | Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim] |
3384 | The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim] |
3393 | How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim] |
3427 | Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim] |
3439 | Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim] |
3424 | Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim] |
3376 | We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim] |
3362 | Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim] |
3413 | Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim] |
3374 | Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim] |
3433 | The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim] |
3377 | Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim] |
3438 | Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim] |
3440 | Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim] |
3375 | If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim] |
24102 | Thoughts are signs (just as words are) [Nietzsche] |
3411 | How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim] |
3386 | Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim] |
3394 | Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim] |
3387 | A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim] |
3410 | Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim] |
3382 | A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim] |
3383 | The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim] |
3408 | Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim] |
3420 | Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim] |
3416 | Content may match several things in the environment [Kim] |
3418 | 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim] |
3421 | Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim] |
3419 | Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim] |
3417 | Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim] |
24120 | Great orators lead their arguments, rather than following them [Nietzsche] |
24097 | The pragmatics of language is more comprehensible than the meaning [Nietzsche] |
3403 | We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim] |
3402 | If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim] |
24108 | Actions are just a release of force. They seize on something, which becomes the purpose [Nietzsche] |
24105 | Drives make us feel non-feelings; Will is the effect of those feelings [Nietzsche] |
24117 | We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control [Nietzsche] |
24113 | Our motives don't explain our actions [Nietzsche] |
24087 | People who miss beauty seek the sublime, where even the ugly shows its 'beauty' [Nietzsche] |
24091 | The sublimity of nature which dwarfs us was a human creation [Nietzsche] |
24093 | We can aspire to greatness by creating new functions for ourselves [Nietzsche] |
24121 | Greeks might see modern analysis of what is human as impious [Nietzsche] |
24107 | Once a drive controls the intellect, it rules, and sets the goals [Nietzsche] |
24085 | For absolute morality a goal for mankind is needed [Nietzsche] |
24101 | We always assign values, but we may not value those values [Nietzsche] |
24094 | Humans are vividly aware of short-term effects, and almost ignorant of the long-term ones [Nietzsche] |
24111 | Happiness is the active equilibrium of our drives [Nietzsche] |
24109 | Actual morality is more complicated and subtle than theory (which gets paralysed) [Nietzsche] |
24110 | Some things we would never do, even for the highest ideals [Nietzsche] |
24103 | You should not want too many virtues; one is enough [Nietzsche] |
24106 | Talk of 'utility' presupposes that what is useful to people has been defined [Nietzsche] |
24086 | The goal is to settle human beings, like other animals, but humans are still changeable [Nietzsche] |
24123 | My eternal recurrence is opposed to feeling fragmented and imperfect [Nietzsche] |
24088 | See our present lives as eternal! Religions see it as fleeting, and aim at some different life [Nietzsche] |
24119 | The eternal return of wastefulness is a terrible thought [Nietzsche] |
24116 | Justice says people are not equal, and should become increasingly unequal [Nietzsche] |
24098 | Reasons that justify punishment can also justify the crime [Nietzsche] |
24118 | Do away with punishment. Counter-retribution is as bad as the crime [Nietzsche] |
24100 | If you don't want war, remove your borders; but you set up borders because you want war [Nietzsche] |
24095 | Our growth is too subtle to perceive, and long events are too slow for us to grasp [Nietzsche] |
3401 | A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim] |
3407 | Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim] |
4800 | Natural laws result from eliminative induction, where enumerative induction gives generalisations [Cohen,LJ, by Psillos] |
24096 | Unlike time, space is subjective. Empty space was assumed, but it doesn't exist [Nietzsche] |
24122 | Life is forces conjoined by nutrition, to produce resistance, arrangement and value [Nietzsche] |