17 ideas
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
23551 | It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M] |
23558 | Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M] |
23550 | Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M] |
23552 | We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M] |
23553 | Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M] |
23555 | Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M] |
23554 | Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M] |
23557 | To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M] |
8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |