15 ideas
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
6375 | The taste of chocolate is a 'finer-grained' sensation than the taste of sweetness [Polger] |
6381 | The mind and the self are one, and the mind-self is a biological phenomenon [Polger] |
6378 | Teleological functions explain why a trait exists; causal-role functions say what it does [Polger] |
6380 | Identity theory says consciousness is an abstraction: a state, event, process or property [Polger] |
6379 | A mummified heart has the teleological function of circulating blood [Polger] |
6377 | Teleological notions of function say what a thing is supposed to do [Polger] |
8430 | Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim] |
8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
4781 | Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos] |