Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causes and Counterfactuals', 'Truth-making and Correspondence' and 'Lives of Eminent Philosophers'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
3035 Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
18365 If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18362 Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18360 It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18358 Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
18355 What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18354 Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David]
18356 Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David]
18363 Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
18364 Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
18357 What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David]
18359 One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
18361 A reflexive relation entails that the relation can't be asymmetric [David]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
1816 Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
1819 Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
3064 When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
3033 Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
1838 Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
1769 Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
8430 Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
8396 Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]
8429 Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
8428 Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
4781 Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]