Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causes and Counterfactuals', 'Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference' and 'Semantics for Propositional Attitudes'

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9 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
9182 Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
15785 Our commitments are to an 'ontology', but also to an 'ideology', or conceptual system [Hintikka]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15786 Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology [Hintikka]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
9181 The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
8430 Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
8396 Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]
8429 Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
8428 Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
4781 Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]