Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Causes and Counterfactuals', 'Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference' and 'A Priori Knowledge Revisited'

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11 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic

12430

Classical logic is our preconditions for assessing empirical evidence [Kitcher]

12431

I believe classical logic because I was taught it and use it, but it could be undermined [Kitcher]

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive

9182	Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett]

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary

12428

Many necessities are inexpressible, and unknowable a priori [Kitcher]

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent

12429

Knowing our own existence is a priori, but not necessary [Kitcher]

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

9181	The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett]

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation

8430	Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation

8396	Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]

8429	Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]

8428	Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims

4781	Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]